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only where the plaintiff was in actual possession, it may now, by virtue of
the act, be maintained though he be not in actual possession," id. at 719,
163 S. E. at 424, although stating further that the statute was not intended to substitute for ejectment a chancery proceeding for removal of
cloud. The instant case in effect holds that, by virtue of the act, suit to
remove cloud may be maintained although plaintiff has neither -actual
nor constructive possession. Elsewhere statutes give equity jurisdiction to
remove cloud when plaintiff is "in or out of possession." Under such
statutes it has been held plaintiff might maintain his action when defendant is in actual possession of the disputed property, Ely v. New
Mexico & A. R. R., 129 U. S. 291, 9 S. Ct. 293, 32 L. ed. 688 (1889)
(Arizona Statute), although the statute did not employ the expression
"actual possession." The Florida statute, in which the term "actual possession" is used, further provides that the action may be maintained
only against a defendant not in actual possession, thereby recognizing
equity jurisdiction only where plaintiff has actual or constructive possession. FLA. CoMp. LAws (1927) §5005.

K.K.H.
EVIDENE-REs IPSA LoQurruR-DOES THE DOCTRINE RAISE A
TRUE PRESUMPTION OF LAW OR ONLY A PERMISSIBLE INFERENCE OF

FACT?-Plaintiff suffered injuries when she ate a piece of cake manufactured by defendant company. The doctrine of res ipsa loquiturwas invoked, and the trial court instructed that, if the jury believed that plaintiff was injured as a result of eating this cake, there is "a primafacie presumption of law that said defendant was guilty of negligence." Verdict
and judgment for plaintiff. Held, that the instruction was reversible error. Reversed and remanded. Holley v. Purity Baking Co., 37 S.E. (2d)
729 (W. Va. 1946).
The doctrine of Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121
W. Va. 119, 2 S.E. (2d) 898 (1939), in which the court said that res
ipsa loquitur "does nothing more than warrant certain inference from
established facts," was reaffirmed. Parr v. Coca Cola Bottling Works,
121 W. Va. 314, 3 S. E. (2d) 499 (1939) and Blevins v. Raleigh Coca
Cola Bottling Works, 121 W. Va. 427, 3 S.E. (2d) 627 (1939) were reexamined and point 1 of the syllabus of each case, which stated that a
prima facie presumption arose and that defendant must present proof
to meet such presumption, modified to conform to the instant holding.

The conflicting West Virginia decisions reflect a diversity observable in
other jurisdictions. Many American courts view res ipsa loquitur as a
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genuine presumption; but "whether the rule creates a full presumption,
or merely satisfies the plaintiffs duty of producing evidence sufficient to
go to the jury, is not always made clear in the rulings." 9 WIoMoRL,
EVIDENCE (3d ed.) §2509, 378-379. Others regard it as a mere permissive inference, (1928) 53 A. L. R. 1494, also 1 JONES, EVIDENCE (4th

ed. 1938) §104a, a view which has been stated by the United States
Supreme Court. See Sweeney v. Erring, 228 U. S.233, 33 S. Ct. 416,
57 L. ed. 815 (1913).
Courts often complicate the question by using res ipsa loquitur,
prima facie case, and presumption of negligence as synonymous terms.
The general rule, however, is that the maxim res ipsa loquitur, if applicable, does not shift the burden of proof, in the sense of "the risk of
non-persuasion," to the defendant, but merely requires that some evidence be produced. Barnowsky v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523, 50 N. W. 989
(1891); Keithly v. Hettinger, 133 Minn. 36, 157 N. W. 897 (1916);
Womble v. Merchants Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474,47 S.E. 493 (1904) ;
Hughes v. Atlantic City R. R., 85 N. J. L. 212, 89 Atl. 769 (1914). In
Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 119, 2 S.E.
(2d) 898 (1939), the court quotes 2 JONES, EVIDENCE 936, to the effect
that res ipsa loquitur is "merely a short way of saying that the circumstances attendant upon the accident are themselves of such character as
to justify a jury in inferring negligence as the cause of the injury. It in no
wise modifies the general doctrine that negligence is not presumed." The
other view, in affirming that a genuine presumption arises out of res ipsa
loquitur, places the burden of going forward with the evidence on defendant, and entitles plaintiff to a directed verdict if defendant offers
no evidence. Wigmore finds the justification of such rule in the circumstance that evidence of the true cause of the injury is practically accessible to the person charged but inaccessible to the injured person. 9 WioMORE, EVIDENCE §2509. It has been said to be wholly useless to have a
distinct doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with the effect merely of laying the
foundation for a permissible inference of negligence and that it would
best serve its excuse for being if treated as a presumption which shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant. Carpenter, Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur (1934) 1 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 519 ("burden of proof" used in
the sense of burden of going forward with the evidence). In the instant
case, Judge Kenna, dissenting on this point, suggested that "the exact
contrary" is rooted in West Virginia. Locally, the doctine was first discussed by name in Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W. Va. 661, 28
S. E. 733 (1897), where the courts said, "In a case of negligence where
the rule of res ipsa loquituris applicable ... the rebuttable presumption
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of negligence retains its original force until overcome by proof of affirmative acts of due care of the defendant." In later cases, the general
effect has perhaps been to create a true rebuttable presumption of law,
throwing upon the defendant the duty of going forward with the evidence. Veith v. Salt Co., 51 W. Va. 96, 41 S. E. 187 (1902) ; Yacobs v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 68 W. Va. 618, 70 S. E. 369 (1911) ; Edmonds
v. Monongahela Traction Co., 78 W. Va. 714, 90 S. E. 230 (1916);
Hodge v. Sycamore Coal Co., 82 W. Va. 106, 95 S. E. 808 (1918) ; cf.
Yones v. Riverside Bridge Co., 70 W. Va. 374, 73 S. E. 942 (1912). But
cf. Diotollavi v. United PocahontasCoal Co., 95 W. Va. 692, 122 S. E.
161 (1924). The instant case and the Webb case, together with the modification of the Parrand Blevins cases, indicate a definite attempt to settle
this question as to the treatment of res ipsa loquitur,as being, not a genuine presumption, but a permissible inference.
C. T.
MINES AND MINERALS

ANNUAL ROYALTY

FOR

LEASES-COVENANT

TO PAY

MINIMUM

TERm.-Plaintiff sued for cancellation of a coal-

mining lease and for relief from payment of further minimum royalties
under the lease to the date of expiration thereof, claiming that the coal
had been exhausted. The lease was for thirty years, twenty-five of which
had passed, contained a promise to pay a minimum three thousand dollars per year subject to increases-contingent on production and was of all
coal in the Sewell seam under a designated tract. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the bill of complaint. Held, that, despite the general
right to rescind for mutual mistake of fact, relief could not be granted
since the promise to pay was unqualified and the lessee assumed the risk.
Rulings affirmed. Babcock Coal & Coke Co. v. Brackens Creek Coal
Land Co., 37 S. E. (2d) 519, 163 A. L. R. 871 (W. Va. 1946).
Plaintiff contended that the minimum royalty provision was incidental to the primary obligation set forth in the lease, diligently and in
a workmanlike manner to mine the Sewell seam of coal, and that its obligation ceased when such coal had been so far exhausted that there was no
longer workable coal in the property, and further asserted mutual mistake of fact. Defendant sought a construction that a lease for a term at a
minimum annual royalty by express stipulation to be treated as rent
reserved upon contract constitutes an absolute undertaking of the lessee
to pay the minimum rental during the entire term from which lessee may
not be relieved because of unfavorable mining conditions or exhaustion
of coal absent expression of a contrary intention.
The authorities are not in accord as to application to mining leases
of the general rule permitting rescission for mutual mistake of fact. Note
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